Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria

We consider agents who do not have any information about others' preferences. In this situation they attempt to behave such as to maximize their chances to obtain their most preferred alternative. This defines a solution concept for games symmetrical to Barbera and Dutta's protective equilibrium, the demanding equilibrium. Necessary and sufficient conditions for self implementation in demanding equilibria (side) of social choice functions are provided.Implementation; Social Choice Function; Demanding Equilibrium; Voting

Experts Playing the Traveler's Dilemma

We analyze a one-shot experiment on the traveler's dilemma in which members of the Game Theory Society, were asked to submit both a (possibly mixed) strategy and their belief concerning the average strategy of their opponents. Very few entrants expect and play the unique Nash equilibrium, while we observe a fifth playing the cooperative solution of the game, i.e. a strictly dominated strategy. The experimental data suggest to analyze the game as one of incomplete information. Most strategies observed are in the support of its Bayesian Nash equilibria. A notable exception is the Nash equilibrium strategy of the original game.Traveler's Dilemma; Experiment; Experts; Incomplete Information

Contingent Commodities and Implementation

In this note we consider the problem whether contingent commodity allocations can be used when the states are not directly contractible. In such a setting a contigent commodity allocation takes the form of a social choice funtion, and the question in whether this function is implementable (in the sense of full implementation). Using only very mild assumptions on the rule for selecting contingent commodity allocations, we derive a strnog negative result which also proves to be robust with respect to different solution concepts employed for implementation. These findings have interesting implications for the interpretation of Arrow-Debreu economie

The Nash bargaining solution is Nash implementable

Naeve J. The Nash bargaining solution is Nash implementable. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 276. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 1997

Lexicographic measurement of the information contained in opportunity sets

An individual who has to choose one item from an opportunity set or menu may lack complete information about the final consequences attached to her choice. This problem has been modeled by Bossert (2000) who introduces an axiomatic approach to the ranking of menus according to their informational content. We propose a different ranking based on the lexicographic ordering on the vectors of numbers of consequences for each item and characterize it axiomatically.

The application of lean management in higher education

Background. The application of lean management is standard in many companies all over the world. It is used to continuously optimise existing production processes and to reduce the complexity of administrative processes. Unfortunately, in higher education, the awareness of lean management as a highly effective methodology is quite low. Research aims. The research aim is to show how the lean strategy can be applied in university environments. Finally, this paper addresses the question why it is so difficult to implement lean in a university environment and how an institution of higher education can move forward towards becoming a lean university. Methodology. Based on a literature review, five key lean principles are presented and examples of their implementation are discussed using short case studies from our own institution. We also compare our findings with those in the literature. Key findings. Lean offers the chance to improve the management of higher education institutions. This requires a commitment on the part of the university top management aiming at convincing all stakeholders that a culture of lean helps the institution to be able to adapt to the rapidly changing environment of higher education

Risikokapitalbedarf als Steuerungsgröße

Es gibt Situationen, in denen es von Vorteil ist, Risikokapital als Kennzahl in die Unternehmenssteuerung aufzunehmen. Wie man den Risikokapitalbedarf eines Unternehmens bestimmt und wie er als Steuerungsgröße eingesetzt werden kann, lässt sich von Banken und Versicherungen lernen

Journal of Indo-European business studies : JIEBS

This is the first copy of JIEBS. The papers it presents are the result of a call for papers CEBS made in 2011. We actually received far more interesting papers and research reports than expected.They all passed a double blind review and the papers naturally are the original work of the named authors. The choice we finally made was also influenced by the topic of the CEBS annual conference 2011, namely the influence of infrastructure and skilled labour on Indo-European Business. The papers analyse structure and explain many issues related to this, they raise questions and point towards areas for further research and they form the nucleus of this new and currently only scientific platform for Indo-European business studies